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GIVING DISCLOSURE ITS DUE: A PROPOSAL FOR
REFORMING THE STARK LAW
Nicholas J. Diamond
ABSTRACT
While the Stark Law has been heavily criticized, calls for repeal have
not been matched equally by substantive proposals for reform. I begin by
revisiting criticisms of the Stark Law, so as to highlight its flawed
beginnings. I then consider whether, in our era of health reform, the design
of the Stark Law accords with emerging themes in the ever-changing
health care regulatory environment. Concluding that it does not, I recast
the oft-neglected proposal for replacing the Stark Law with a system of
disclosure. I sketch how such a system might look, utilizing the recently
enacted Physician Payment Sunshine Act as a model.
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We must leave this terrifying place tomorrow and go searching
for sunshine.
F. Scott Fitzgerald
I. A DIFFERENT KIND OF DISCLOSURE
Most discussions of the Stark Law begin with an acknowledgment of
its immense complexity. 2 Its labyrinthine provisions, however, belie its
straightforward object, namely, financial conflicts of interest.3 As
originally conceived, the Stark Law had a narrow focus with regard to
financial conflicts of interest within the context of physician self-referrals.
Early design of the Stark Law recognized that conflicts of interest were
more likely to occur where a physician self-refers a patient for clinical
laboratory services to an entity in which she has a financial interest.
4
However, in the over twenty-one years since the first iteration of the Stark
Law, "Stark I," went into effect, this basic theme has undergone much
change.5 For many, the result is an untenable regulatory scheme that has,
inter alia, had a "chilling ... effect on the practice of medicine," and an
overall detrimental impact on the health care industry.
6
In this article, I do not intend to champion the Stark Law against such
critics. Not surprisingly, the Stark Law has few proponents. Even the
1 F. SCOTT Fitzgerald, This Side of Paradise 4 (1920).
2 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (Dec. 19, 1989)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn) ["Stark I"]. The Stark Law was revised in 1993. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13, 562, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified in relevant part at
Social Security Act § 1877, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2008)) ["Stark II"]. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Assn of Va.,
Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994) stating:
There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions in question, involving the
financing of Medicare and Medicaid, are among the most completely impenetrable texts
within human experience. Indeed, one approaches them at the level of specificity herein
demanded with dread, for not only are they dense reading of the most tortuous kind, but
Congress also revisits the area frequently, generously cutting and pruning in the process and
making any solid grasp of the matters addressed merely a passing phase.
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2013) (setting forth the basic prohibition underlying the Stark Law).
4 See Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 15, 15 (2011) (characterizing
Stark I as having "humble beginnings as a relatively narrow proscription .... "); see also §§
1395nn(a)(2)(A)-(B) (defining a financial relationship of a physician, or an immediate family member of
such physician, with a referred entity).
5 See MICHAEL K. LOUCKS & CAROL C. LAM, PROSECUTING AND DEFENDING HEALTH CARE FRAUD
CASES 322 (2nd ed. 2011) (describing chronological changes made to the Stark Law).
6 Irwin "Ham" Wagner, The Difficulty of Doing Business with Stark in an Ever-Changing and Overly
Complex Regulatory Environment: After Twenty Years, Where Are We Heading? 19 ANNALS HEALTH L.
241, 242 (2010). See generally Paula Tironi, The "Stark" Reality: Is the Federal Physician Self-Referral
Law Bad for the Health Care Industry? 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 235 (2010).
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Congressman who originally conceived and subsequently shepherded its
passage later expressed doubts as to its merits. 7 I will, instead, argue that
the Stark Law not only arose under misguided intentions, but faltered
further still in its promulgation. This historical analysis finds commonality
with other criticisms of the Stark Law. While such commentary is crucial
to an appreciation of its flawed roots, it does not sufficiently explain why,
in our era of substantial change under health reform, the Stark Law
continues to make little sense.8 To this end, in the first half of this article I
will argue that the Stark Law is an anachronism in the current health care
regulatory environment. Such a position motivates the frequent argument
for repeal.
Even if this argument is successful, a related issue remains as to
whether there should be some law that stands in its place. In view of the
hearty criticisms levied against the Stark Law, it stands to reason that most
critics would prefer that a void remain where the Stark Law once stood. I
contend, however, that this sentiment is chiefly the product of
preconceived notions of the nature of a regulatory scheme that might stand
in its place, namely, one that is equally complex and punitive. Before
considering my argument as to a wholly different way for the law to
approach physician self-referrals, two assumptions should be surfaced.
First, my arguments require acceptance that financial conflicts of
interests are fundamentally problematic for the health care profession. This
is not a controversial assumption. Prominent codes of conduct in the
medical profession, for instance, unambiguously articulate the problematic
nature of physician financial conflicts of interest.9 Second and perhaps
more controversially, my arguments require recognition that physician
financial conflicts of interest are proper objects of regulation. For those
who subscribe to self-regulation of the medical profession, this claim will
prove unpalatable. While I find such a position untenable, not least
because it discounts history,10 I cannot hope to meet such a steadfast
opinion in this context.
7 See Sutton, supra note 4, at 17-18 (describing Rep. Stark's later lament toward enactment of the law that
bears his name).
8 The term "health reform" is used throughout as a reference to the body of reforms implemented under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "ACA"].
9 See, e.g., American Medical Association, Opinion E-8.0321 - Physicians' Self-Referral, AMA CODE OF
MED. ETHics (2009), available at http://www.ama-assn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion8032l .page ("[Physician self-referral] arrangements can also be ethically
challenging when they create opportunities for self-referral in which patients' medical interests can be in
tension with physicians' financial interests. Such arrangements can undermine a robust commitment to
professionalism in medicine as well as trust in the profession.").
10 See, e.g., Sylvia R. Cruess & Richard L. Cruess, The Medical Profession and Self-Regulation: A Current
2014]
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If these assumptions are well taken, the question becomes, how
would a law that speaks to physician self-referrals look, if it is not to
resemble the Stark Law? Substantial treatment of this inquiry is
confusingly lacking in the literature on the Stark Law. This dearth should
not be construed as evincing disagreement with the assumptions
articulated above. The literature does contain a few proposals for reform, I
I
which suggests that there is at least some receptiveness to the assumption
that physician financial conflicts of interest are proper objects of
regulation. In comparison to ample criticisms of the Stark Law, however, a
relative paucity of attention has been directed toward further developing
these proposals for reform as an appropriate companion to such criticisms.
To this end, I will consider one proposal for reform that has not
received its due. Various commentators have dismissed the merits of
replacing the Stark Law with a system of disclosure. Under existing
proposals, such a system would require physicians to directly disclose to
their patients any financial interests in entities to which they make
referrals. 12 This option exhibits various flaws, which I will delineate
below. It would be hasty, however, to dismiss the value of a system of
disclosure, though cast in different terms, as an alternative to the Stark
Law. I will argue that the recently enacted Physician Payment Sunshine
Act ("Sunshine Act"), 13 which addresses potential conflicts of interest in
the health care profession under different yet fundamentally related
conditions, can serve as a model for developing a system of disclosure as
an appropriate alternative to the Stark Law.
Challenge, 7 VIRTUAL MENTOR 1, 1 (2005), at 1, stating:
Standards were considered to be weak, variable, and inconsistently applied, and physicians
were further accused of using collegiality as a means of shielding poorly performing peers.
Medicine was further criticized for its lack of openness and transparency in regulatory
procedures and for the absence of public involvement in them. In short, the system appeared
to lack accountability, and it was suggested that an informed public should participate in
medicine's regulation. Many of these criticisms proved to be accurate and had an impact on
both public policy and on the level of trust that the profession enjoyed.
available at http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2005/04/pdf/opedl-0504.pdf
11 See, Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein, Note, The Stark Law: Conquering Physician Conflicts of Interest? 87
GEO. L.J. 499, 528-29 (1998) (arguing for a broad solution that would first study the relationship between
physician self-referrals and overutilization of services, and then evaluate the whole of health care fraud and
abuse laws to assess their shortcomings); see generally E. Haavi Morreim, Blessed Be the Tie That Binds?
Antitrust Perils of Physician Investment and Self-Referral, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 359 (1993) (arguing for
physician self-referrals to be regulated under an array of existing laws, such as those directed toward
informed consent, fiduciary duties, and antitrust matters).
12 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 11, at 527-28.
13 Medicare, Medicaid, Children's Health Insurance Program; Transparency Reports and Reporting of
Physician Ownership or Investment Interests, 78 Fed. Reg. 9,458 (Feb. 8, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 402, 403).
2014] GIVING DISCLOSURE ITS DUE 5
II. A BRIEF HISTORY
During the 1980s, the health care industry underwent significant
change, ushered in by a newfound focus on cost containment. 14 Pressures
to curb expenditures in the provision of care surfaced following
implementation of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS), which
set reimbursement according to a predetermined amount that reflected the
average treatment cost in a specific diagnostic-related group, 15 rather than
according to the actual cost of treatment.1 6  This radical shift in
reimbursement methodology fostered competition amongst providers, who
sought new ways to curb expenditures, such as shifting the provision of
some health care services to less expensive nonhospital settings. 7 The
emergence of new medical technologies also contributed to increased
provider competition, as new advancements offered the promise of
streamlining previously expensive health care services.
18
The proliferation of care in nonhospital settings and the advent of
new medical technologies in toto resulted in an increased level of financial
involvement by physicians in the various mechanisms associated with the
provision of care. 19  The reasons for this increase were fairly
uncomplicated. Because physicians have an intimate understanding of
which health care services are most needed in their communities, they
were able to draw from this firsthand knowledge to identify profitable
investments.20 Moreover, confronted with the pressing need to curb
expenditures, physicians were motivated to develop unorthodox strategies
to mitigate losses resulting from increased marketplace competition.
21
Increased physician investment in health care services brought about
a more pronounced culture of so-called "self-referrals," where a physician
14 Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements: Legitimate Business or Unethical
'Entrepreneurialism', 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61,63 (1989).
15 Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1983)); see Tironi, supra note 6, at 236 (explaining the importance of the shift affected
by implementation of the PPS); see also McDowell, supra, at 64 (describing how the PPS and other cost
containment measures brought about significant competition in the health care marketplace).
16 See Christian D. Humphreys, Comment, Regulation of Physician Self-Referral Arrangements: Is
Prohibition the Answer or Has Congress Operated on the Wrong Patient? 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 161, 162
(1993) ("Prior to the 1983 Amendments [to Medicare reimbursement], hospitals were reimbursed by the
federal government for the actual dollar amount incurred in the treatment of a Medicare patient.")
17 McDowell, supra note 14, at 64.
18 Id.; see William R. Kucera, Jr., Note, Hanlester Network v. Shalala: A Model Approach to the Medicare
and Medicaid Kickback Problem, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 413, 424 (1996); see also Tironi, supra note 8, at 236.
19 McDowell, supra note 16, at 64.
20 Steven D. Wales, The Stark Law: Boon or Boondoggle? An Analysis of the Prohibition On Physician
Self-Referrals, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 3-4 (2003).
21 McDowell, supra note 14, at 64.
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refers a patient to a secondary entity in which she holds a financial
interest. 22  These referrals encompassed a swath of circumstances,
including services performed in separate locations and various in-office
technologies.23  Interestingly, physician self-referrals were "fairly
common" in the 1970s.24 With the shift toward nonhospital care settings in
the 1980s, however, the increasingly close relationship between care and
investment interests brought about a heightened potential for abuse.25 Put
plainly, "[p]hysicians who invested in health services were accused of
controlling both supply and demand.,
26
Some characterize self-referrals as "a natural outgrowth of the
competitive health care industry and the physician's unique position in the
industry, '27 whereas others argue that self-referrals exhibit a fundamental
conflict of interest.28 Both positions are partially correct. The mere fact
that a physician stands to personally profit from the provision of care is,
ceteris paribus, unobjectionable. That physicians might avail themselves
of the prospect of increased profitability because of opportunities
presented by new trends in the health care field is equally unremarkable. In
the financial industry, for instance, the law does not broadly curb
professionals' ability to invest according to their investment acumen or
market experience. It is only when, for example, personal profits result
from trading on "insider information" that the law asserts itself to eradicate
unfairness in the marketplace.
29
22 Morreim, supra note 11, at 362.
23 Id.
24 Tironi, supra note 6, at 236; see Morreim, supra note 11, at 361-62, stating:
Historically, such physician referrals have not been controversial. Hospital choice was
usually fairly simple. Even if there were more than one hospital in town, the physician often
only had staff privileges at one of them, and thus the choice of hospital was obvious.
Similarly, when a subspecialist medical consultant was needed, the physician would select a
trusted colleague. So long as physicians were mainly in solo or in small-group, single-
specialty practices, a referral to a consultant of another specialty carried no possibility of
financial gain for the referring physician. [Citation omitted] Only rather recently have
groups of physicians begun to join together in large, multispecialty group practices and to
share in the revenues of keeping consultant referrals within the group.
25 Kucera, supra note 18, at 424-25.
26 Tironi, supra note 6, at 237.
27 McDowell, supra note 14, at 64-65.
28 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Hanson, Note, The Academic Medical Center Exception to the Stark Law.
Compliance By Teaching Hospitals, 61 ALA. L. REV. 373, 374-75 (2010) (describing Rep. Stark's
objections to physician self-referral arrangements); see also Wales, supra note 22, at 13-14 (summarizing
common arguments against the physician self-referrals based on inherent conflicts of interest).
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2013) making it:
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange ...
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
GIVING DISCLOSURE ITS DUE
Yet, as opponents of self-referrals would contend, the degree of
closeness between the provision of care and investment interests seems
ethically problematic. Broadly, some have criticized how health care
became intertwined with commercial concerns beginning in the 1980s
which, some argue, interfered with the ethical and social duties required of
physicians in caring for their patients. 30 More specifically, the American
Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics, for instance, characterizes
self-referrals as "ethically challenging" and asserts that they should be
permitted only under specific conditions including, inter alia, ensuring that
financial benefit is not dependent on the volume of referrals and providing
for mechanisms to review referral practices. 31 That a lengthy list of
sometimes onerous conditions should first be satisfied does not augur well
for the ethical permissibility of physician self-referrals.
III. MISGUIDED BEGINNINGS
Despite the absence of a widely accepted ethical objection to
physician self-referrals, economic objections gained strength in the late
1980s. A 1989 report published by the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
of the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) proved to be a
watershed moment in the turn toward comprehensive regulation of
physician self-referrals. 32 The report findings were both expected and
highly controversial. Not surprisingly, the report found that physicians had
investment interests in a gamut of health care businesses, from clinical and
physiological laboratories, to nursing homes and ambulatory surgical
centers.
33
More controversially, the report found that eight percent of
physicians who billed Medicare had compensation arrangements, ranging
from space rental agreements to consulting agreements, with entities to
which they referred patients. 34 Nationally, the report found that many
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013) (promulgating requirements pursuant to section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
30 See, e.g., Arnold S. Relman, 325 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 854, 858 (1991) ("In my view, that means we
should not only be competent and compassionate practitioners but also avoid ties with the health care
market, in order to guide our patients through it in the most medically responsible and cost-effective way
possible.").
31 American Medical Association, supra note 11, at §§ 3(a)-(b).
32 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES 28-29, (May 1989), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai- 12-88-01410.pdf.
33 Id.
34 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 34, at 11.
2014]
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referring physicians held whole or partial ownership interests in
independent clinical laboratories (ICLs) (25 percent), independent
physiological laboratories (IPLs) (27 percent), and durable medical
equipment suppliers (DMEs) (8 percent).35 More controversial still, it
found that patients of referring physicians who own or invest in ICLs
received forty-five percent more clinical laboratory services, irrespective
of place of service, as well as thirty-four percent more direct services from
ICLs, as compared with all Medicare patients. 36 Similarly, patients of
physicians who invest in IPLs utilized thirteen percent more IPL services
compared with all Medicare patients.37 Cautioning that the "actual effect is
probably higher," the report concluded that this level of utilization cost
Medicare $28 million in 1987 alone. 38
As proponents of self-referrals have argued, this report admits of a
few flaws. Chiefly, the report does not make the crucial distinction
between overutilization and increased utilization of services. 39 While it
demonstrates that physicians with investment interests in entities to which
they refer patients tend to utilize a greater amount of services, it does not
show that these services were more than would be medically necessary
under the circumstances.40 More importantly, the report fails to connect an
increased volume in provided services with a lower quality of care or poor
health outcomes. 41 Finally, the report does not conduct a comparative
analysis to determine whether physicians without investment interests in
the entities to which they refer patients might be underutilizing services.
4 2
Despite these weaknesses, the report served as a tipping point for
Congressional action. In particular, Representative Fortney Stark of
California believed that robust legislative action would prevent physicians
from defrauding-federal health care programs by engaging in what he
deemed "referral schemes. 43 More specifically, Representative Stark
believed that the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), which requires a showing
of intent, was too weak to adequately regulate self-referrals. a  To
countermand this weakness, he advocated for the creation of a bright line





39 Tironi, supra note 6, at 237.
40 Humphreys, supra note 16, at 172.
41 Kucera, supra note 18, at 426.
42 Klein, supra note 11, at 508.
43 Wagner, supra note 6, at 243-44.
44 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2013); Wagner, supra note 6, at 243-44.
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of interest existed in self-referral arrangements. 45  Such a test,
Representative Stark opined, would combat the negative ramifications of
physician self-referrals, namely, compromising patient care, billing federal
health care programs for unnecessary services, and engendering unfair
competition in the marketplace through physician kickbacks from
suppliers.46
In 1993, the second iteration of the Stark Law, "Stark II," arose in the
wake of influential studies on the ramifications of physician self-referrals,
some of which persuasively argued that physician conflicts of interest
were far more pervasive than originally thought. 47 Though it had similar
motives to its predecessor, Stark II expanded the comparably humble
scope of Stark I to include a gamut of health care services and financial
arrangements. 48  This expanded scope contributed to a torturous
implementation timeline. Even though Stark II was enacted in 1993,49
HHS did not promulgate final regulations for Stark I until 1995.50 Stark II
regulations would not be published until 1998.51 Similar delays plagued
the release of various phases of Stark II regulations during the period from
2001 to 2008.52
Critics cite these chronological delays and inconsistencies as
problematic for legal counsel, who must contend with conflicting and
generally uncertain provisions, which require constant restructuring of
agreements to ensure continued compliance. 53 The complexity of the
regulations themselves, as I have noted above, further exacerbates this
difficulty. For instance, despite the numerous exceptions carved out in
subsequent revisions, the changing dynamics of the health care industry
45 Hanson, supra note 28, at 374.
46 Wagner, supra note 6, at 244.
47 Sutton, supra note 4, at 22.
48 See Klein, supra note 11, at 511 ("Although the Stark laws have changed considerably over time, the
rationale invoked to justify them remained relatively constant.").
49 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 12,562, 107 Stat. 312 (Aug. 10,
1993).
50 Physician Financial Relationships With, and Referrals to, Health Care Entities That Furnish Clinical
Laboratory Services and Financial Relationship Reporting Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,914 (1995) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411).
51 Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships, 63 Fed.
Reg. 1659 (proposed Jan.9, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435 & 455) (proposed Jan. 9,
1998).
52 Proposed in 2001, Phase I of the regulations to Stark II went into effect in 2002. 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan.
4, 2011). Phase II of the regulations to Stark II went into effect in 2004. 69 Fed. Reg. 16,054 (Mar. 26,
2004). Phase III regulations were published in 2007, with many going into effect later that year. 72 Fed.
Reg. 51,012 (Sept. 5, 2007). Phase IV regulations were published in 2008, with many going into effect later
that year. 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434 (Aug. 19, 2008).
53 Wagner, supra note 6, at 245.
2014]
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often result in new financial relationships that do not fall cleanly under
delineated Stark Law exceptions. 54 This has the effect of both cultivating
confusion and thwarting earnest industry efforts toward maintaining
compliance.55 Consequently, providers must devote significant time and
resources to retaining and working with legal counsel to forestall
56inadvertent violations. As one critic concludes, "Stark soundly fails to
fulfill its mission of providing easily understood bright line tests."57
Critics also rightly aver that penalties for violations are particularly
severe, not least because the Stark Law is most frequently enforced
through the False Claims Act (FCA). -58 As one critic states, by prosecuting
potential violations of the Stark Law under the FCA, the federal
government unfairly takes advantage of qui tam mechanisms, thereby
creating a "bounty system. 59 Significant expansion of the FCA
exacerbates this worry because a claim may be brought not only for
presenting a false claim to the federal government, but also for submitting
a false claim to any federal funds recipient.
60
Equally troubling for providers, the Stark Law is a strict liability
statute and, thus, the government need not demonstrate a knowing and
willful violation as is required under the AKS. 61 For entities struggling to
navigate the complexities of the Stark Law, strict liability only serves to
further aggravate difficulties by punishing inadvertent violations. Finally,
with the availability of the FCA, the AKS, and various antitrust
protections, it is unclear what equitable or practical purpose the added
liability of the Stark Law serves.
62
IV. AN ANACHRONISM
While these flaws do much to weaken the merits of the Stark Law,
their implications cut much deeper when viewed against the backdrop of
health reform under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Stark Law arose
as a response to changes in the climate of the health care industry
54 Sutton, supra note 4, at 35-36.
55 Id.
56 Klein, supra note 11, at 517.
57 Wagner, supra note 6, at 245-46.
58 Tironi, supra note 6, at 239; see 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2013).
59 Klein, supra note 11, at 525.
60 See § 3729(b)(2)(a)(ii) (defining "claim" to include those made to a "contractor, grantee, or other
recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government's behalf or to advance a
Government program or interest ... ").
61 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (requiring knowing and willful conduct) with 72 Fed. Reg. 51,026
(explaining that "[t]he physician self-referral law is a strict liability statute").
62 Klein, supra note 11, at 524.
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following implementation of the PPS. That climate, compared with the
current Medicare reimbursement landscape under the ACA, looks
markedly different. The current landscape under the ACA is marked not
by a parochial focus only on cost containment, as was the case under the
PPS, but sweeps broadly to incorporate equal concern for both access to
and quality of care. 63 Health reform operates under the assumption that
anything less than such a comprehensive approach would be insufficient to
"bend the cost curve." 64 This assumption can be witnessed, for instance, in
the ACA's so-called "three-legged stool," which takes a multi-pronged
approach to reforming private health insurance markets.
65
More specifically, on the public health insurance side, Medicare
reimbursement today looks far beyond the ambit of the PPS to incorporate
broader payment calculi that speak to the tripartite aims of cost, quality,
and access. This focus is emblematic of the broader shift away from the
fee-for-service system toward a system that promotes and rewards high-
value care, as opposed to an increased volume of services, which has long
been thought to create perverse incentives in the system. 66 The Value-
Based Payment Modifier which, by 2015, will adjust payments under the
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule to a physician or groups of physicians
based on the quality of care provided relative to cost during a performance
period, represents just one instance of a reimbursement system that is
shifting toward promoting value, conceived as an optimal balance of cost
and quality 67
63 The ACA contains innumerable provisions that speak to the quality of and access to care. See, e.g.,
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial
Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834 (Feb.'25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 147, 155,
and 156) (requiring that all health plans offered in the individual and small group markets cover at
minimum a specified list of essential health benefits); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (2013) (requiring
individuals, subject to certain exceptions, to maintain "minimum essential" health insurance coverage or
pay a penalty).
64 See, e.g., Ezekiel Emanuel, et al.- A Systematic Approach to Containing Health Care Spending, 367
NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 949, 949 (2012) (describing the notion of "bending the cost curve" as a
comprehensive effort to reduce the rate of growth' of health care spending in the United States relative to
gross domestic product).
65 See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a "Three-Legged Stool": The Costs of Partially
Repealing the Affordable Care Act, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 1, 2 (2010),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing reform.pdf ("At the [ACA]'s core is a
"three-legged stool" approach to reforming these markets: new rules that prevent insurers from denying
coverage or raising premiums based on preexisting conditions, requirements that everyone buy insurance,
and subsidies to make that insurance affordable.").
66 Maura Calsyn & Emily Oshima Lee, Alternatives to Fee-for-Service Payments in Health Care CENTER
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 1, 1 (2012),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/FeeforService-I .pdf.
67 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(8)(i) (2013).
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Various other programs with similar goals are already in place. For
instance, the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, which took effect
in fiscal year 2013, evaluates hospitals under performance metrics
designed in the aggregate to promote high-value care and then provides
incentive payments, funded by a variable-percentage reduction in
diagnosis-related group payments across all hospitals, to high
performers. 68 As a further example, the Hospital Readmissions Reductions
Program, which took effect in fiscal year 2012, withholds a percentage of
Medicare reimbursement for hospitals with too many avoidable
readmissions for certain medical conditions within thirty days of
discharge.
69
Other programs with similar goals focus specifically on the provision
of care. Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and related programs,
such as Medicare Shared Savings and the Advance Payment ACO Model,
endeavor to create provider groups that coordinate care to both improve
health outcomes and reduce costs. 70 The group of thirty-two Pioneer ACOs
experienced moderate success at improving quality and producing shared
savings in 2012.71 Future programs aimed at better coordinating care to
help improve quality and lower costs include episode-based payments,
such as bundled payments, which incentivize quality improvement by
paying providers based on the entire episode of care, rather than for
individual services.72
The Stark Law, therefore, is an anachronism in the present regulatory
climate. Having its roots in an era where cost was considered independent
of both access to and quality of care, the Stark Law speaks to a way of
thinking about health care that is fast becoming outdated. This contention
differs from saying that, despite its parochial focus on cost, the Stark Law
can still play a more modest role in the trajectory of health reform. Rather,
the point is that the Stark Law proceeds from a faulty starting position
because it considers only cost, while ignoring the related and crucial issue
of whether self-referrals have a negative effect on the quality of care. This
can be witnessed, for instance, in the OIG report. By wholly ignoring a
concern that is of central import to health reform, the Stark Law distances
68 § 1395ww(o).
69 § 1395ww(q).
70 See generally Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations
76 Fed. Reg. 67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
71 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations succeed
improving care, lowering costs (Jul. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-Releases/2013 -Press-Releases-Items/2013-
07-16.html.
72 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2013).
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itself from the present foci of the health care regulatory environment.
Instead, the Stark Law needs to be recast to bring a wider gamut of timely
considerations to bear on how the law addresses physician self-referrals.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A proposal for a system of disclosure as an alternative to the Stark
Law has not been given its due consideration. The conventional proposal
for such a system goes thus: before making a referral, the physician must
disclose to her patients whether and to what extent she holds an investment
interest in the entity to which the referral would be made. 73 It is unclear,
however, what would occur after the patient receives this information. The
notion seems to be that the patient could determine of her own accord
whether there is a significant financial conflict of interest present, which
would in turn bear on whether she grants consent to performance of the
referred service. Presumably, the patient would likewise be able to weigh
personal cost concerns based on factors like insurance coverage and any
related out-of-pocket costs. In some instances, where the nature of the
referred service carries a degree of personal physical risk, the patient could
also weigh whether the perceived benefits outweigh the attendant risks.
This proposal has obvious flaws. First, it is unclear why the burden of
disclosure should be placed on the individual physician, as opposed to the
institution or practice group that employs the physician. Direct disclosure
by the physician would likely harm the physician-patient relationship by
casting doubt upon the trustworthiness of the physician. 74 One can imagine
how the mechanics of direct disclosure would seem to imply to the patient
that something is awry. Moreover, the average patient is not equipped to
assess the totality of the disclosed information.75 This form of disclosure,
therefore, presumes an unreasonable level of medical knowledge of the
average patient. There are still further practical concerns that weaken such
a proposal. For instance, as is the case in other forms of disclosure in
medical settings, the demands of an urgent medical emergency tend to
aggravate the expected orderliness of disclosure protocols.76
73 Id. at 527.
74 Klein, supra note 11, at 527.
75 Id.
76 See American College of Emergency Physicians, Code of Ethics for Emergency Physicians II(A)(2)
(Apr. 2011), available at http://www.acep.org/Clinical---Practice-Management/Code-of-Ethics-for-
Emergency-Physicians/ ("The unique setting and goals of emergency medicine give rise to a number of
distinctive ethical concerns. Among the special moral challenges confronted by emergency physicians are
the following ... Second, patients in the emergency department often are unable to participate in decisions
regarding their health care because of acute changes in their mental state. When patients lack decision-
making capacity, emergency physicians cannot secure their informed consent to treatment ... ").
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Disclosure need not be made directly to the patient, however. In
contrast, a more workable system of disclosure would turn on disclosure to
the federal government, specifically, under conditions that would further
the push for transparency in health care that the ACA envisions.77 While
disclosure would not be made directly to the patient, she would have
access to the disclosed information, which could then become part of her
medical decision-making process, if so desired. As for the federal
government, the availability of information on physicians' financial
interests in entities to which they refer patients would provide valuable
data that could be analyzed to identify and predict fraudulent conduct.
78
Perhaps more crucially, as I discuss below, the simple act of having to
disclose this information might itself serve as a valuable deterrent.
Disclosure is not an altogether new concept for the Stark Law. For
instance, the ACA makes a significant addition with regard to self-
disclosure under the Stark Law. Section 6409(a) of the ACA requires the
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) to establish a self-referral
disclosure protocol (SRDP) that sets out a process by which providers may
self-disclose actual or potential violation of the Stark. Law. 79 HHS later
articulated this process. 80 The SRDP affords providers the opportunity to
avoid the otherwise harsh penalties that accompany a Stark Law violation
through settlement mechanisms with reductions in amounts owed for
actual violations.81 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services'
(CMS) Division of Technical Payment Policy has recently confirmed that
the SRDP has been popular amongst providers. 82
77 The ACA contains innumerable provisions that promote health care transparency. See, e.g., Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange
Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,341 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 155, 156, and 157)
(explaining that Health Insurance Marketplace "policies and protocols must be consistent with the principle
of 'Openness and Transparency,' which states that there should be openness and transparency about
polices, procedures, and technologies that directly affect individual and/or their personally identifiable
health information.").
78 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) already utilizes a variety of analytics platforms
to prevent and detect fraud. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
FRAUD PREVENTION SYSTEM - FIRST IMPLEMENTATION YEAR i (2012) (reporting to Congress on the
successes of the newly-developed Fraud Prevention System (FPS), which utilizes predictive analytics
technologies to identify and prevent the payment of improper claims in the Medicare fee-for-service
program).
79 ACA § 6409(a).
80 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, CMS VOLUNTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE
PROTOCOL 1 (2011), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/
PhysicianSelfReferral Downloads/6409_SRDPProtocol.pdf.
81 ACA § 6409(b).
82 James Swann, Stark Law Self-Disclosure Proving to Be Very Popular, BLOOMBERG BNA HEALTH
CARE BLOG, (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.bna.com/stark-law-selfdisclosure-b17179872988/.
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The Stark Law contains another provision addressing disclosure,
albeit of a different kind. As originally conceived, the Stark Law set forth
a series of mandatory reporting requirements regarding physician
"ownership, investment, and compensation arrangements." 83 Specifically,
this disclosure has two basic components. First, the entity billing Medicare
has to identify the items or services that it provided.84 Second, the entity
has to identify the names and "unique physician identification numbers of
all physicians with an ownership or investment interest" or with "a
compensation arrangement" in the entity.85 However, CMS never
promulgated specific reporting requirements, likely because it recognized
that enforcing these provisions would impose a heavy burden on both itself
and the health care industry.86 Stark II later added clarifying language on
the state of these requirements such that disclosure under section
1395nn(f) need only be submitted "upon request." 87
The first step toward setting forth a system of disclosure to replace
the Stark Law would be to articulate what specifically must be reported.
The requirements under section 1395nn(f) establish a reasonable scope.
These requirements satisfy the prima facie need to identify which services
have been provided and by whom, and whether the referring physician has
an investment interest in the referred entity. The regulations further specify
that disclosure must include "the nature of the financial relationship
(including the extent or value of the ownership or investment interest or
the compensation arrangement). 8 This level of detail helps to distinguish
between minor investment interests, where the risk for abuse is likely
minor, and significant investment interests, where the risk for abuse may
be greater.
Second, a system of disclosure would, contrary to changes under
Stark II, not be upon request, but instead be mandatory, with attendant
penalties for failure to adhere. Replacing the Stark Law with a system of
disclosure without mandatory reporting would hinder the federal
government by limiting the availability of data for analysis, prediction, and
detection of fraud and abuse law violations, namely, under the FCA and




86 The Stark II Phase II Interim Final Rule, CROWELL & MORING (Apr. 6, 2004),
http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/Health-Law-In-The-News/The-Stark-11-Phase-II-
Interim-Final-Rule#I12E.
87 42 C.F.R. § 411.361(e) (2013).
88 § 411.361(c)(4).
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balance between ensuring that the federal government has access to useful
data and the reality of some degree of fraudulent billing conduct in
government health care programs.
As a model for developing such a system, I propose drawing from the
recently finalized Physician Payment Sunshine Act ("Sunshine Act")89
because it speaks broadly to the issue of financial conflicts of interest that
may affect treatment decisions. Generally, the Sunshine Act requires
manufacturers of drugs, devices, biologicals, or medical supplies covered
by Medicare, Medicaid, or the Children' Health Insurance Program
(CHIP), and applicable group purchasing organizations (GPOs), to
annually report certain payments or transfers of value made to physicians
or teaching hospitals. 90  It likewise establishes similar reporting
requirements for physician ownership or investment interests in said
manufacturers or GPOs. 91 Importantly, the Sunshine Act provides for
transparency of this collected information by requiring that HHS publish
submitted payment and ownership information on a public website.
92
A system of disclosure that would replace the Stark Law should, in
concert with mandatory reporting, develop a similar procedure for
fostering transparency through online publication of reported data. As the
preamble to the Sunshine Act final rule asserts, "transparency will shed
slight on the nature and extent of relationships, and will hopefully
discourage the development of inappropriate relationships and help
prevent the increased and potentially unnecessary health care costs that
can arise from such conflicts." 93 CMS has recently made other data
publically available online in an effort to further promote transparency in
the health care industry. Most notably, in May of 2013, CMS published a
detailed spreadsheet online of hospital-specific charges for more than
3,000 hospitals that receive Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment
System payments for the top 100 most frequently billed discharges.
94
Further, as Rosenthal and Mello capture, transparency garners favor
"because it buttresses rather than constrains markets, avoiding the need for
more intrusive, direct regulation." 95 Particularly in the instance of
89 78 Fed. Reg. 9,458.
90 Id. at 9,522.
91 Id. at 9,525.
92 Id. at 9,458.
93 78 Fed. Reg. 9,458, supra note 89, at 9,459.
94 Medicare Provider Charge Data, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Aug. 15, 2013,
7:17AM), http://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/medicare-
provider-charge-data/index.html.
95 Meredith B. Rosenthal & Michelle M. Mello, Sunlight as Disinfectant - New Rules on Disclosure of
Industry Patients to Physicians, 368 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 2052, 2053 (2013).
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physician self-referrals, where intrusive regulation has been part and
parcel to maintaining compliance with Stark provisions, emphasizing
transparency in a new regulatory design is of special import. This form of
transparency, as with the Sunshine Act, affords consumers qua patients the
opportunity to factor such information into their medical decision-making
process, if so desired.
This is not to say, however, that the success of such efforts toward
transparency need hinge on how patients ultimately utilize the available
information. In the context of longstanding public reporting of provider
quality information, Rosenthal and Mello rightly point out that patients are
often unaware of such information and, even when aware, tend to rely on
other factors when choosing a provider. 96 Yet, as they also note, use of
such information by "expert intermediaries" may prove more fruitful.97
For instance, they reference publically available Securities and Exchange
Commission filings which, though publically available, are targeted more
toward institutional advisors and financial analysts with the expertise to
surface and discipline violations.98 In a similar sense, while patients could
obviously benefit from transparency under the proposed system of
disclosure, the federal government could play the crucial role of expert
intermediary, utilizing available data to detect and prosecute fraudulent
conduct.
To motivate compliance, the proposed system of disclosure must be
backed by penalties. The structure of penalties outlined in the Sunshine
Act could serve as a sound model. 99 Penalties under the Sunshine Act
differentiate between a basic failure to report and a knowing failure to
report. 100 By adopting a similar bifurcated penalty structure, the proposed
system of disclosure would make significant strides toward obviating the
frequent charge of unfairness levied against strict liability under the Stark
Law. As is the case under the Sunshine Act, penalties should be greater in
an instance of a knowing failure to report.10 1 Equally important, penalties
must be reasonable on the whole. The Sunshine Act caps penalties per
payment, other transfer of value, or investment interest not timely or
accurately reported, as well as caps them with respect to civil monetary
96 Id.
971d.
98 Id. at 2054.
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penalties. 10 2 The proposed system of disclosure should implement similar
caps to militate against unreasonable levels of liability.
Two weaknesses of the proposed system of disclosure bear mention.
First, maintaining compliance under this proposal would likely be costly
for providers. For instance, providers would have to bear the financial
burdens of properly tracking and reporting various physician investment
interests. One estimate of the cost to comply with the Sunshine Act, for
example, reached nearly $200,000 per firm, irrespective of legal fees and
information technology infrastructure costs.10 3 However, it is well known
that compliance with the Stark Law is extraordinarily expensive. 10 4
Moreover, noncompliance with the Stark Law stands to carry much more
severe penalties.' 0 5 In this sense, while precise cost estimates for the
proposed system of disclosure are unavailable, it stands to reason that they
would be less than is currently the case under the Stark Law.
The proposed system of disclosure would also, arguably, not entirely
circumvent the prospect of compounded liability for claims brought
concurrently under the FCA. In this sense, providers would still be
exposed to added liability, much as is presently the case under the Stark
Law. However, the determination of whether a violation of the Sunshine
Act, or a similar system like the one proposed herein, could also implicate
liability under the FCA is not readily apparent. 1°6 For instance, the
Sunshine Act final rule offers the predictable comment that compliance
with its provisions does not result in exemption from potential liability
under the FCA. 10 7 Moving from this bare statement to a FCA violation,
however, requires at least a few subsequent steps. One commentator has
102 Id.
103 Arundhati Parmar, Cost to comply with the Sunshine Act could be nearly $200k per firm, MEDCITY
NEWS (Apr. 25, 2012 2:53 PM), http://medcitynews.com/2012/04/cost-to-comply-with-sunshine-act-could-
be-nearly-200k-per-firm/.
104 See Klein supra note 11, at 517.
105 See LOUCKS & LAM, supra note 5, at 361 stating:
Although [Stark Law penalties] seem severe, they could be just the tip of the iceberg, as any
referral arrangement in violation of the Stark prohibitions also would be subject to the anti-
kickback statute's criminal enforcement penalties. On top of these severe civil penalties, the
physician, the physical therapy clinic, and its other owners can be subject to a lengthy (and
costly) grand jury investigation, which could result in criminal prosecution.
106 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (setting forth the seven basic provisions upon which most health care fraud
claims are brought under the FCA).
107 See 78 Fed. Reg., 9460 (Feb. 8, 2013), stating:
We also want to emphasize that compliance with the reporting requirements of section
1128G of the Act does not exempt applicable manufacturers, applicable GPOs, covered
recipients, physician owners or investors, immediate family members, other entities, and
other persons from any potential liability associated with payments or other transfers of
value, or ownership or investment interests (for example, potential liability under the Federal
Anti-Kickback statute or the False Claims Act).
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speculated that already suspicious employees with insider knowledge
might be able to use published data in Sunshine Act transparency reports
to catalyze a qui tam action, yet precisely how this would occur remains
uncertain.'°8
VI. CONCLUSION
The Stark Law admits of various weaknesses and is an anachronism
in this era of health reform to boot. For these reasons, calls for repeal of
the Stark Law are well founded. Yet proponents of repeal have not offered
sufficient alternative proposals as to what should stand in its place. One
insufficient proposal, as I have examined, suggests implementing a system
of direct disclosure by physicians as to investment interests in referred
entities. While such a proposal is both misguided and burdened by
uncertainty as to how execution would occur, this is not to say that a
system of disclosure is an altogether implausible alternative. A more
propitious alternative would be shepherded by provisions in the Sunshine
Act and, therefore, give disclosure its due weight.
108 Kelly M. Cleary, Physician Payment Sunshine Act: How Hot Could It Get in the Sun? BNA's HEALTH
CARE FRAUD REPORT 1, 5 (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://cdn.akingump.com/images/content/2/3/v2/2312 1/Physician-Payment-Sunshine-Act-How-Hot-Could-
It-Get-In-the-Sun.p.pdf.
2014]

